

Rapid Response—Compensation Strategies To Address Teacher Shortages

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Request: A state department of education (SDE) served by the Southeast Comprehensive Center (SECC) at SEDL requested information regarding teacher shortages, specifically merit pay, compensation strategies, and other actions taken or under consideration by SDEs to address this issue.

Overview

Although viewpoints abound on the best approaches for improving low-performing schools and raising student achievement, experts agree on one thing—providing effective teachers is crucial to these efforts. Regulatory requirements and education funding programs as well as widespread adoption of common standards for English language arts and mathematics are a few factors spurring initiatives to increase access to qualified, effective teachers for all U.S. students. “On this point education research is clear—effective instruction matters. Teachers are the single most important school-level influence on student achievement¹” (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010, as cited in Reform Support Network, 2011, p. 1).

Despite increasing focus on this issue, some states are facing difficulties attracting and retaining effective teachers in hard-to-staff schools, which may include schools identified as low-performing and/or high-needs and those serving large percentages of students living in disadvantaged communities. States also face challenges maintaining adequate numbers of effective teachers in hard-to-fill subjects such as mathematics, science, technology, special education, and foreign languages.

Based on the client’s request, this report focuses on compensation strategies—performance pay, bonuses, salary increases, performance-based awards, and other incentives—that may be considered to address the issue of teacher shortages. The procedure for selecting resources on this topic, limitations of this report, and the results of the resource review are discussed below.

Procedure

To obtain resources for this response, SECC staff relied primarily on information contained within the Web site of the federally funded Center for Educator Compensation Reform (CECR), because the center provided thorough syntheses of the research related to the topic of this report. The CECR site, operated by Westat in partnership with Learning Point Associates (now part of the American Institutes for Research), Synergy Enterprises, Vanderbilt University, and the University of Wisconsin–Madison, serves as the primary storehouse of information, resources, and tools to support the design and implementation of policies for compensation reform. In particular, SECC staff focused on syntheses of research in five key areas: general compensation, compensation for teachers of hard-to-fill subjects and teachers in hard-to-staff schools, performance pay, measurement of effectiveness, and stakeholder support for new compensation systems. Staff also reviewed descriptions of state and local compensation reform efforts in the states served by SECC—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.

In addition to the CECR site, SECC staff reviewed information from the National Center on Performance Incentives, the National Education Policy Center, and the Southern Regional Education Board. Refer to the Summaries of Resources and the Additional Resources sections of this report for details.

Limitations

SECC staff focused on syntheses of research as reported by CECR as well as information from the above named organizations. As such, the summaries featured in this report are not inclusive of all available research on the topic of alternative teacher compensation. In addition, primary sources were consulted only when clarification of information contained within a particular synthesis was necessary.

SECC does not recommend or endorse any strategies, initiatives, or policies discussed in this report.

Summaries of Resources

The Center for Educator Compensation Reform's Web site contains numerous resources that may prove beneficial in designing an equitable, legally defensible alternative compensation system. The Web site is divided into four major categories: *New to Performance-Based Compensation*, *Development and Implementation*, *National Perspective*, and *TIF Grantees*.

The following major points, from the *Research Syntheses* section of the above referenced *New to Performance-Based Compensation* category of the CECR Web site, describe both benefits and limitations of the use of alternative compensation. As previously stated, the information is presented in five key areas, which are discussed below.

General Compensation

Impact of Compensation on Teacher Retention

- Simply increasing the amount of money for teacher salaries probably will not solve teacher retention problems (Miller, n.d.a).
- Salary issues, new teacher support, improved student motivation, and increased teacher roles and input on school matters are equally important to teachers when contemplating leaving the teaching profession (Miller, n.d.a—citing Ingersoll & Smith, 2003).
- Instead of implementing uniform salary increases, targeted salary increases, accompanied by program modifications that address the various reasons teachers are exiting the teaching profession, may be the more cost-effective approach (Miller, n.d.a).
- Increased salaries did not positively impact math and science teachers' retention rates (Miller, n.d.a—citing Podgursky, 2004).
- The cost of higher salaries may not be cost effective when compared to the resulting insignificant decreases in teacher exit attrition (Miller, n.d.a—citing Borman & Dowling, 2008).
- Salaries impact teacher decisions to transfer to another school. Even though increasing salaries may decrease the number of teachers who transfer to a neighboring district, the impact of the salary increase is dependent upon how that increase compares to salaries in nearby districts. Raising salaries at the district level may ultimately increase the number of teachers exiting the profession for a non-teaching position, because there no longer are opportunities for higher paid positions (Miller, n.d.a—citing Imazeki, 2005).

Teacher Effectiveness with Improving Student Achievement

- The identification of highly effective and highly ineffective teachers only occurs after student learning gains have been analyzed. The identification of the most effective teachers for the upcoming year and subsequent years is very difficult (Prince et al., n.d.a). However, researchers studying Cincinnati's teacher evaluation system found that performance scores were an accurate predictor of future teacher performance and student achievement (Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2006).
- Regardless of their students' initial achievement levels, highly effective teachers were successful with all student groups. Likewise, highly ineffective teachers were unsuccessful with all student groups (Prince et al., n.d.a—citing Sanders & Rivers, 1996).

Relationship of Teaching Degrees/Years of Experience to Student Achievement

- Advanced degrees and years of teaching experience, measures commonly used in teacher compensation systems, do not automatically equate with higher student performance. Possible exceptions include initial years of experience and certain secondary level advanced degrees, such as those in mathematics and science (Prince et al., n.d.b).
- Measuring a teacher's ability to increase student outcomes is more effective than standard automatic rewards for educational degrees and years of teaching experience in identifying and rewarding highly effective teachers (Prince et al., n.d.b).
- The first few years of a teacher's work in a classroom yield the greatest gains in teacher effectiveness (Prince et al., n.d.b).

Application of Lessons Learned From the Private Sector

- For program success and sustainability, both the design and the implementation of pay for performance programs are critical (Prince et al., n.d.c—citing Beer & Cannon, 2004).

Compensation for Teachers of Hard-to-Fill Subjects and Teachers in Hard-to-Staff Schools

Special Teacher Groups

- Increasing salaries can help in reducing attrition among minority teachers in high-risk districts (Prince et al., n.d.f—citing Kirby et al., 1999).

Optimal Salary Increases for Mathematics, Science, and Technology Teachers

- The ideal amount of an optimal salary increase still is unresolved, but increases ranging from \$10,000–\$15,000 may be what are necessary for science, mathematics, and technology individuals to select teaching as their career of choice. Another consideration is how much the earning gap widens over time between teachers and non-teachers with science, mathematics, and technology backgrounds (Prince et al., n.d.g).
- Evidence indicates that district incentives of several thousand dollars are not sufficient to attract teachers of hard-to-fill subjects. Also, because salary differentials are not as prevalent in the early teaching years, only considering entry level salaries may be misleading (Prince et al., n.d.g—citing Goldhaber et al., 2007).
- Research suggests that if small salary increases were given to all district teachers, no matter what their specialization, elementary teacher turnover would be disproportionately reduced, but the impact on mathematics and science teachers would be negligible. Instead, to reduce attrition of highly effective teachers in subject shortage areas, significantly larger salary increases would be needed (Prince et al., n.d.g—citing Podgursky et al., 2004).
- Undergraduate mathematics, science, and technology majors most frequently cited low salaries as the reason they did not select teaching as a career (Prince et al., n.d.g—citing Milanowski, 2003).

- The results of a survey (Prince et al., n.d.g—citing Milanowski, 2003) of science, mathematics, and technology undergraduate majors and pre-majors indicated that:
 - o Due to considerations such as job responsibilities and individual strengths/interests, there is a limited impact of salary increases as a way to increase the pool of mathematics and science teachers.
 - o Both a student's major and anticipated future salary impact the amount of the teaching salary increase necessary for that student to consider teaching as a career option. Consequently, the salary increase needed to attract these individuals to a school district may be unrealistic.
 - o Entry level salaries for mathematics and science teachers would need to be increased by more than 5–10% to attract these undergraduates to the profession.
 - o If entry-level salaries were increased by approximately 25%, about one-fifth of the respondents would consider a teaching career.

Hard-to-Staff Schools

- Currently there has been little empirical research that identifies the financial amount needed to recruit and retain teachers in hard-to-staff schools (Prince et al., n.d.e).
- Evidence indicates that substantially increasing teacher salaries in hard-to-staff schools can increase teachers' willingness to work in such schools (Prince et al., n.d.e—citing Goldhaber, DeArmond, & DeBurgomaster, 2007).
- Because financial compensation is only one of many job factors important to teachers, the amount of the salary increase does not need to be as large if districts take steps to improve the schools and the associated working conditions (Prince et al., n.d.e).
- Two strong and significant predictors of teacher attrition are low salaries and poor working conditions (Prince et al., n.d.e—citing Loeb, Darling-Hammond, & Luczak, 2005).
- Hard-to-staff schools are almost twice as likely to have higher than average teacher attrition rates (Prince et al., n.d.e—citing Ingersoll, 2001).

Other Factors in Solving Staff Shortages

- Research implies that hard-to-staff schools are often lacking the various types of institutional resources necessary to support induction programs for new teachers and mentoring programs for all teachers (Prince et al., n.d.d—citing Kelly, 2004; Johnson et al., 2004).
- In solving staffing shortages in hard-to-staff schools, school leadership, school working conditions, and professional culture are vital factors to consider (Prince et al., n.d.d).
- An additional factor that influences teacher attrition at high-needs schools is the overall school atmosphere, including student behavior and discipline (Prince et al., n.d.d—citing Futernick, 2007; Kelly, 2004; Koppich, Humphrey, & Hough, 2007).

Performance Pay

Data Systems

- States must support education data infrastructures in order to have the capacity to effectively track teacher performance or administer pay systems (Goldhaber, 2010).
- States must develop systems that allow for connecting teachers to individual student achievement over time, a prerequisite for assessing teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber, 2010).

Teacher Quality

- Federal priorities such as Race to the Top and Teacher Incentive Fund have expanded the concept of teacher quality established in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to the concept of teacher effectiveness (Miller, n.d.e).

- Higher salaries may encourage more highly skilled persons to become teachers (Miller, n.d.e—citing Ferguson & Gilpin, 2009; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007; Hoxby & Lerigh, 2004).
- Higher salaries increase the number of teacher job applicants but may not increase the quality of the teachers employed (Miller, n.d.e—citing Goldhaber, 2001; Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 1999).
- Nonmonetary factors such as working conditions may influence teacher quality as much as compensation (Miller, n.d.e—citing Ferguson & Gilpin, 2009; Hanushek et al., 1999; Goldhaber, 2001).
- Higher salaries should not be relied on as the only means to ensure teacher quality (Miller, n.d.e).
- The few quantitative studies that have been conducted indicate that teacher compensation for performance could have a positive impact on the allocation of quality teachers among schools (Goldhaber, 2010).
- Effective pay for performance systems should offer incentives and opportunities to enhance teacher knowledge and skills rather than focus only on rewarding success (Makkonen, 2005).
- Effective professional development programs can contribute to teacher retention, enhance classroom instruction, and increase teacher quality (Prince et al., n.d.m).

Competition vs. Collaboration

- Evidence suggests that individual incentive programs do not decrease collaboration among teachers (Miller, n.d.b—citing Barnett, Ritter, Winters & Greene, 2007; Springer et al., 2009; Springer et al., 2010; Miller, n.d.c).

Performance Pay Amount

- The amount of the performance pay does not appear to influence student achievement (Prince et al., n.d.h).
- The size of the performance incentive must be large enough to be viewed as meaningful by teachers (Prince et al., n.d.h).
- The size of the performance pay influences teacher retention (Prince et al., n.d.h).
- Teachers may view a small bonus amount negatively (Prince et al., n.d.h—citing Heneman, 1998 and Odden & Wallace, 2007).
- Performance incentives will probably need to be higher to be viewed as meaningful to teachers in high-needs schools (Prince et al., n.d.h).
- The size of the incentive should be related to the amount of work that is required to attain the desired result (Prince et al., n.d.h).

Measurement of Effectiveness

Teacher and Principal Evaluation Without Value-Added Measurements

- A performance evaluation system that includes measures of teachers' instructional practices is most powerful in identifying performance-based salary increases and in improving teacher quality (Schuermann, n.d.—citing Odden & Wallace, 2007; Odden, Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2001).
- Performance evaluation systems and student learning objectives, two research-based approaches that are not value-added measurements, can be used to effectively evaluate educator performance, resulting in data that relates to value-added measurements (Schuermann, n.d.—citing Goldhaber, 2002; Kimball, White, Milanowski, & Borman, 2004).

- Research does not support a consensus in the identification of those teacher characteristics that consistently support student learning gains. Because of this lack of consensus, it is unknown if teacher effectiveness can be evaluated other than by direct observations of actual teaching experiences (Schuermann, n.d.—citing Goldhaber & Anthony, 2004).

Rewards for Teachers Working in Low-Performing Schools

- Districts using pay-for-performance/attainment models unfairly reward teachers in low-poverty schools, thereby reducing teacher motivation to pursue teaching in high-poverty, low-performing schools (Quinn, n.d.).
- The use of a value-added model equalizes opportunities for all teachers, including those working in low-performing schools (Quinn, n.d.).
- In districts using value-added models, teachers who have low-performing students are not penalized if their students demonstrate appropriate growth, because the value-added models take into consideration prior student achievement (Quinn, n.d.—citing Goldhaber & Hansen, 2008; Meyer, 1996; Sass, 2008; Winters, Greene, Ritter, & Marsh, 2008).
- Regardless of the functioning level of the school, value-added models are best when evaluating teacher performance because individual student growth is measured over a specified period and models can account for additional factors, including various student characteristics and the effectiveness of previous teachers (Quinn, n.d.).

Teacher Effectiveness Measures Resulting in Accurate, Reliable, and Defensible Performance-Based Rewards

- Many researchers contend that correlating teacher salaries with student achievement and other teacher productivity measures could result in stronger teachers and improved student performance (Prince et al., n.d.—citing Mohrman, Mohrman, & Odden, 1996; Odden, 2000; Odden & Kelley, 2002).
- When designing teacher compensation systems, districts must control student baseline test scores for student prior achievement, family characteristics, student mobility, and test errors (Prince et al., n.d.—citing Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004).
- Model teacher compensation systems collect student test data over multiple years and match teachers with the students, grades, and subjects they teach (Prince et al., n.d.—citing Thorn, 2002; Thorn, Glover, & Watson, 2007).
- Research suggests that more than 1 year of value-added data is needed to make reliable high-stakes teacher effectiveness decisions, including teacher tenure and retention decisions (Prince et al., n.d.—citing Schochet & Chiang, 2010). If multiple years are not available, a viable option is rewarding whole groups of teachers (such as whole school, grades, and/or departments) for improved student performance (Prince et al., n.d.).
- Additional factors to consider in designing teacher compensation systems include both selection bias (students self-selecting particular schools) and assignment bias (principals assigning certain students to select teachers). One way to manage this bias is to reward teacher productivity by using grade level value-added measures, such as rewarding all the teachers in a grade when that grade's scores increased (Prince et al., n.d.).
- If value-added measures are not possible, research suggests that observation-based classroom evaluations may be valid measures (Prince et al., n.d.—citing Milanowski, 2003; Jacob & Lefgren, 2005).

Relationship of Teachers' Knowledge and Skills to Student Achievement Outcomes

- Typical teacher pay-for-performance measures, namely teaching experience and educational degrees, are not reliable predictors of student achievement. Research has not substantiated the relationship between degrees and student achievement. After 3 to 5 years, the results of years of teacher experience level off, and there is inconclusive evidence on the impact of advanced-level teacher qualifications on student achievement (Prince et al., n.d.k).
- Research suggests that student achievement is impacted by a teacher's general intelligence, verbal skills, and subject matter knowledge (Prince et al., n.d.k).

Relationship of Principals' Evaluations of Teachers to Student Achievement Outcomes

- Although research suggests that principals' evaluations of teachers, one of multiple measures to be used, are an important component of teacher evaluation systems, it is not clear the weight that should be assigned to these evaluations when used for teacher compensation. Therefore, states and districts will need to identify what works best based on their particular circumstances (Prince et al., n.d.j).
- Objectivity, accuracy, and fairness are teachers' biggest concerns with principals' evaluations, particularly because these evaluations are a major part of many performance awards (Prince et al., n.d.j). Reasons that principals experience difficulty in conducting teacher evaluations include lack of subject matter knowledge, disinclination, and maintaining the status quo in the working environment (Prince et al., n.d.j—citing Halverson, Kelley, & Kimball, 2004; Nelson & Sassi, 2000; Peterson, 2000; Stein & D'Amico, 2000).

Stakeholder Support for New Compensation Systems

Compensation System Structure

- Unions are more supportive when teachers are involved in the design of the system (Prince et al., n.d.o—citing (Haty, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994; Odden, Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2001; Springer et al., 2008).
- Teacher involvement enhances the effectiveness of compensation systems (Prince et al., n.d.p—citing Odden et al., 2001).
- An effective compensation program should be part of a cohesive, comprehensive system that includes teacher training and professional development (Prince et al., n.d.o—citing Milanowski, 2003; Milanowski, Heneman, & Kinball, 2009; Odden et al., 2001; Solomon & Podgursky, 2000).
- Policymakers must send a consistent message that new compensation systems are going to persist over time (Prince et al., n.d.o). Teachers, especially those in large urban districts, are often unconvinced that new programs are going to endure (Prince et al., n.d.o—citing Milanowski, 2006).
- New compensation systems may need to be sustained to realize improvements in teacher quality and student achievement. Leadership must demonstrate continued commitment to the system and possible positive outcomes (Prince et al., n.d.o).
- Teachers must be convinced that the possible high cost of the compensation system will continue to be supported (Prince et al., n.d.o—citing Azordegan, Greenman, & Coulter, 2005).
- Administrators must implement the system with fidelity to sustain teacher support and acceptance (Prince et al., n.d.o—citing Milanowski, 2006).
- State level systems may be more likely to garner support than local performance pay systems. State level systems may reduce the negative local political consequences of differential compensation (Goldhaber, 2010).

- Errors made in differentiated teacher compensation would significantly erode public and political support for compensation reforms. A poorly designed system of compensation could lead to legal action (Goldhaber, 2010).
- Several compensation programs have been implemented and evaluated. However, there are too few pay reforms analyzed to provide adequate information about the efficacy of specific compensation reform structures (Goldhaber, 2010).
- Clear and consistent communication about the performance compensation system is vital for establishing and maintaining participant trust (Makkonen, 2005).

Teacher Perceptions of Fairness

- Teachers' views of fairness of compensation systems affect their willingness to engage in performance pay programs (Prince, et al., n.d.i; Prince, et al, n.d.q).
- Teachers have concerns about compensation systems that they view as unduly subjective, such as principal evaluation (Prince, et al., n.d.q).
- Teachers are skeptical of compensation systems based on student standardized test scores. They view these systems as holding teachers accountable for factors that are out of their control, such as socioeconomic level and parent support (Prince, et al., n.d.q).
- Teachers are more likely to support compensation systems that use a variety of measures rather than relying on a single measure of performance (Prince, et al., n.d.q—citing Azordegan, et al., 2005).

Survey Results

- Survey results indicate that the public supports performance pay for teachers (Prince, et al., n.d.n—citing Gallup, 2010).
- The public supports more pay for teachers who work in high-needs schools (Prince, et al., n.d.n—citing Gallup, 2004).
- Teachers are increasingly supportive of new types of compensation systems, but this support varies by individual and workplace conditions (Prince, et al., n.d.n).
- Teachers tend to support additional compensation for teachers in low-performing schools (Prince, et al., n.d.n).
- Preference for the types of performance pay systems varies greatly among teachers (Prince, et al., n.d.n).
- Well-designed teacher surveys should be conducted and carefully analyzed prior to adopting a new compensation system (Prince, et al., n.d.n—citing Goldhaber, et al., 2007).

In addition to the above information on evaluating and rewarding the performance of teachers, CECR provides information on terminology usage. In the article titled *Alternative Compensation Terminology: Considerations for Education Stakeholders, Policymakers, and the Media*, Rowland and Potemski (2009) explore the use of various terminology in referring to alternative compensation initiatives.

“Currently, the field uses dozens of expressions to describe these different reform efforts, including the following: merit pay; performance pay, or performance-based compensation; alternative compensation; differential pay (including “knowledge- and skills-based pay”); teacher incentives or incentive pay; teacher bonuses.”

(Rowland & Potemski, 2009, p. 1)

The authors note that CECR recommends terminating the use of the term “merit pay” to describe alternative compensation, as merit pay historically refers to teacher salary increases based on principal evaluations, which often are problematic. Instead, when describing an alternative compensation system, CECR stresses the importance of including descriptions of the specific performance measures to be rewarded and in using terms consistently.

An additional source regarding alternative compensation is the National Center on Performance Incentives, a national research and development center for state and local policy. NCPI is funded via a cooperative agreement between the Institute of Education Sciences, the U.S. Department of Education, and Vanderbilt University. The purpose of NCPI is to explore the impact of financial incentives for teachers, administrators, and schools on teacher quality and student learning.

Table 1, Compensation Reform Initiatives in SECC States as Reported by CECR and NCPI (see page 10), provides information on district and state initiatives in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Preceding this summary is a discussion of resources from the National Education Policy Center and the Southern Regional Education Board.

Additional Resources

Creating Teacher Incentives for School Excellence and Equity

This policy brief (<http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/NEPC-PB-TchrPay.pdf>) from the National Education Policy Center discusses current approaches to teacher incentives nationwide (including efforts in Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and New York City). It also reviews research on rewarding performance and attracting and retaining teachers in high-needs schools. Key points from the brief are summarized below (Berry & Eckert, 2012):

- A review of federal Teacher Incentive Fund sites indicates that performance pay systems can be implemented successfully if they are (a) integrated with teacher evaluation that focuses on improved instruction and collaborative professional development; (b) teacher leaders are used to provide on-site support, evaluation, and oversight of improvements in instruction; (c) incentives provide rewards for extra work and achievement; and (d) stakeholders are involved in the design, implementation, and effectiveness of reform efforts (pp. 4–5).
- Studies show that financial incentives may be insufficient to attract and retain teachers for high-needs schools and that decision makers should also focus on developing strong school leadership, positive working conditions, and a safe, nurturing learning environment (pp. 5–8).
- Research indicates that smaller class size and common planning time are desired school characteristics; however, “what teachers desire is the know-how to teach their subjects as well as the autonomy and supports to best meet the needs of their students” (p. 9).

Focus on Teacher Reform Legislation in SREB States: Tenure, Dismissal and Performance Pay Policies

This report (http://publications.sreb.org/2011/11S11_Focus_Tenure.pdf) from the Southern Regional Education Board focuses on legislation related to teacher reforms enacted by 12 of the 16 SREB states. On pages 12–13, Dixon (2011) discusses performance pay policies from 2009–2011, which include alternative compensation plans for teachers in hard-to-staff schools or in fields with teacher shortages, pay for knowledge and skills, pay for improved performance, and performance pay for individual teachers or on a school-wide basis for improvements in student growth or student achievement.

Table 1. Compensation Reform Initiatives in SECC States as Reported by CECR and NCPI		
State	Description of Initiatives	URL
Center for Educator Compensation Reform		
AL	<p>Three school district initiatives are described.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Butler County’s PayPLUS program: Provides incentives to teachers and principals in areas of school performance, teacher effectiveness, student achievement growth, and teacher attendance. 2) Lowndes County Teacher Incentive Project: Provides incentives for teachers based on involvement in professional development and leadership activities, evaluation results, credentials, student performance, and school performance. 3) Mobile County School District’s Mobile Transformation Plan: Provides bonuses for teachers, principals, and assistant principals of five low-performing schools based on student or school achievement scores and individual performance evaluations. 	http://cecr.ed.gov/map/alabama.cfm
GA	<p>The Georgia Department of Education (GaDOE) alternative compensation programs include the following: a 5% salary increase based on student performance, teacher opportunities for career ladder advancements, group activity performance awards (schoolwide achievement gains), and incentives for hard-to-fill subjects such as mathematics, science, special education, and foreign languages.</p> <p>A program overview, salary structure, implementation guidance document, and case summary are available.</p>	http://cecr.ed.gov/map/georgia.cfm
LA	<p>The Louisiana Department of Education (LDOE) is designing and implementing a performance-based differentiated compensation system that is aligned with reform efforts and reliant upon value-added measures of student achievement. LDOE receives TIF funds to implement the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) and is expanding the program with the goal of a sustainable compensation system using non-TIF funds. A program overview, LDOE TAP information, news articles, a TIF grant profile and case summary are available on the Web site.</p> <p>Seven compensation programs are also highlighted:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) National Institute for Excellence in Teaching is partnering with five hard-to staff schools operated by a charter organization to implement a performance-based compensation system. 2) St. Bernard Parish Public School District is implementing TAP (developed by the Milken Family Foundation) in two schools. 3) Iberville Parish Schools developed a unique compensation system focusing on 10 high-needs rural schools. 4) Jefferson Parish Public Schools are implementing TAP in two schools. 	http://cecr.ed.gov/map/louisiana.cfm

Table 1. Compensation Reform Initiatives in SECC States as Reported by CECR and NCPI

State	Description of Initiatives	URL
	<p>5) New Schools for New Orleans is collaborating with the Recovery School District and three charter school management organizations to implement a performance-based compensation system in 29 high-needs schools.</p> <p>6) Algiers Consortium of Charter Schools Incentive Reform is partnering with the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching to implement the TAP system.</p> <p>7) Recovery School District has implemented a state approved performance compensation program since 2008.</p> <p>Overviews and selected articles are available for each program.</p>	
MS	<p>One state/district initiative is described.</p> <p>1) Mississippi Department of Education’s New Direction pilot program in 10 high-needs schools: Provides financial incentives for teachers and principals based on educator evaluation and professional development. Performance-based compensation is one of five components of the comprehensive, integrated system.</p>	<p>http://cecr.ed.gov/map/mississippi.cfm</p>
SC	<p>Three school district initiatives are described.</p> <p>1) Charleston County’s Teacher Outstanding Performance (TOP) program: Provides incentives for teachers for student achievement based on a student growth model.</p> <p>2) Florence County’s South Carolina’s Teacher Advancement Program (SCTAP+): Addresses local capacity building to improve student achievement and teacher retention/recruitment.</p> <p>3) Richland County’s Pay for Results program: Provides bonuses to all school staff based on schoolwide and individual classroom performance.</p> <p>Two state initiatives are described.</p> <p>1) South Carolina Teacher Incentive Fund (SC TIF): Provides incentives to teachers and principals based on student achievement or on additional responsibilities, with additional financial incentives to teachers teaching hard-to-staff subjects or poor, minority, and disadvantaged students.</p> <p>2) South Carolina Teacher Advancement Program (SC TAP): Provides performance-based compensation to recruit, develop, enhance, and retain quality educators in South Carolina’s high-needs schools.</p>	<p>http://cecr.ed.gov/map/southCarolina.cfm</p>

Table 1. Compensation Reform Initiatives in SECC States as Reported by CECR and NCPI		
State	Description of Initiatives	URL
National Center on Performance Incentives		
AL	Information is provided on the same three district initiatives that are described in the above chart.	http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/StateNews/Alabama1.pdf
GA	<p>The following information is in addition to the district and state initiatives that are described above.</p> <p>GaDOE received a Race to the Top grant in August 2010. Approximately \$400 million was awarded to implement initiatives in four core reform areas including great teachers and great leaders.</p> <p>Teacher Incentive Fund Grantee New Leaders, Inc./National Charter School Consortium (2007 grantee) established the Effective Practice Incentive Community (EPIC) in 2006 to link incentive pay to the wide-scale sharing of effective educational practices. The EPIC national charter school consortium is made up of schools from 23 states and the District of Columbia.</p>	http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/StateNews/Georgia1.pdf
LA	<p>The following information is in addition to the district and state initiatives that are described above.</p> <p>A link is provided to the national System for Teacher and Student Advancement Program Web site to obtain information on the following local projects:</p> <p>Advance Baton Rouge Charter Schools Association (also a TIF Grantee) Algiers Charter Schools Association (also a TIF Grantee) Ascension Public Schools Caddo Public Schools District Delhi Charter School District DeSoto Parish Schools East Baton Rouge Parish Schools East Feliciana Parish School System Iberia Parish School System Jefferson Parish Public Schools Natchitoches Parish Schools Pointe Coupee Parish School System Rapides Parish School District St. Bernard Parish Public Schools St. Tammany Parish Public Schools Tangipahoa Parish School System</p>	http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/StateNews/Louisiana1.pdf

Table 1. Compensation Reform Initiatives in SECC States as Reported by CECR and NCPI		
State	Description of Initiatives	URL
MS	Information is provided on the same state/district initiative that is described above.	http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/StateNews/Mississippi_NE_W1.pdf
SC	<p>The following information is in addition to the district and state initiatives that are described above.</p> <p>One school district initiative is described.</p> <p>1) Richland County School District Two initiative: Provides individual performance-based incentives, based on progress toward 12 district goals, to all principals and members of the superintendent's cabinet.</p> <p>A New Leaders for New Schools/National Charter School Consortium initiative is described.</p> <p>1) Effective Practice Incentive Community: Provides incentives to principals, assistant principals, teachers, and instructional aides in schools with significant student achievement for sharing effective educational practices with other educators.</p>	http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/StateNews/South_Carolina_NEW.pdf

References

Note. Open hyperlinks using Adobe Reader. If a hyperlink does not open after it is clicked, copy and paste the entire hyperlink into the Internet browser window to access the resource.

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